Abstract-Modern trojans are equipped with a functionality, called WebInject, that can be used to silently modify a web page on the infected end host. Given its flexibility, WebInject-based malware is becoming a popular information-stealing mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information-stealing trojans allows a mal ware operator to intercept credentials such as usernames, passwords, and second factors of authentication (e.g., PINs or token-generated codes) or to alter how pages are rendered on the client side at their will (e.g., search engine result poisoning, click fraud). These trojans are also referred to as "banking trojans", because they are often used to steal banking credentials when the victim is using an online banking service. However, their flexibility made them easily adaptable to various uses. According to a recent Symantec report [9] , in 2012 more than 600 institutions 978-1-4799-3 503 -1/14/$3l.00 ©2014 IEEE 13 9
were targeted and a peak of more than 160,000 (October) of computers were compromised with financial trojans.
As we detail in Section II, the typical information steal ers implement the interception mechanism through injection modules. An injection module, codenamed "WebInject", ma nipulates and inject arbitrary content into the data stream transmitted between an HTTP(S) server and the browser. This is implemented through function hooks placed between the rendering engine of the browser and the network-level libraries.
Previous work [5] leveraged this observation to detect the hooking libraries as a sign of infection. As a result, WebInject based trojans are able to circumvent any form of transmission encryption such as SSL. Moreover, a recent incident analysis reported by NASK [2] shows that customized variants of ZeuS are used to create an effective attack scheme involving both a PC and mobile component.
Nowadays, the common practice is that security researchers and professionals exchange samples, as soon as they become available, within private online communities. This makes it easy to obtain and run samples, resulting in quick reaction times, quicker than in the past. However, not all security analysts of targeted institution are equally equipped or skilled to perform accurate reverse engineering. Indeed, the analysis of these malware families, as well as others, require time consuming reverse engineering, which result in slower reac tion, even when samples are readily available. In fact, the detection rates of ZeuS are low. Another method used to extract the trojan configuration files is via memory forensics (e.g., by executing the sample in a sandboxed environment and extracting a memory dump for subsequent carving). The outcome of such analyses normally includes the decrypted webinjecttxt file, which is useful for security analysts of targeted institutions, because it allows to verify if and how their website is targeted by an information-stealing campaign. An other interesting use case is the automatic analysis of samples that perform search engine result poisoning. Last, we notice that developers of sensitive web applications (e.g., online banking), possibly targeted by WebInject-based malware, are left with no tools that they can use to mitigate the effect of this threat. For instance, it would be great if a developer could pro grammatically "annotate" a page as "potentially targeted" to have an automatically-generated JavaScript procedure attached whenever the page is delivered to the client. Once rendered on the client page, such procedure would perform a sanity check to determine the presence of injections from known samples.
Unfortunately, the above mentioned techniques are based on the assumption that the mal ware will never change or alter the way configuration files are encrypted-decrypted in memory.
This inherent limitation makes these methods not future proof, and shows the need for automatic methods that characterize the injection behavior of a malware, to tell whether an end host is infected by which known sample, or whether a given website is targeted by some known binary, before spending time to reverse engineer it.
The goal of our approach, called ZARATHUSTRA, is to automatically characterize the WebInject-based behaviors re gardless of the underlying implementation. In addition, we want to isolate precisely the injected code, as if the config uration files of the mal ware variant were available. Our key observation is that, regardless of how the hooking mechanism works, the action of an injection module must eventually result in changes to the document object model (DaM).
ZARATHUSTRA analyzes samples by first rendering a website page multiple times in instrumented browser instances that runs on distinct, clean machines. ZARATHUSTRA repeats the same procedure on an infected machine, and finally extracts the resulting, malicious differences in the form of an Xpath query along with metadata-which we call "fingerprints". A specific challenge that we tackle is the removal of legitimate DaM differences (e.g., due to ads, A-B testing, cookies, load balancing, anti-caching mechanisms). These differences would otherwise result in false positives. The fingerprint-generation system runs on dedicated machines with no interactions with real clients.
We evaluated ZARATHUSTRA against 213 real, live URLs of banking websites and 56 distinct samples of ZeuS. In all cases, our system generated fingerprints correctly. We analyzed the low fraction of false positives and found that most of them were caused by legitimate differences found in the original web pages, which are tackled by ZARATHUSTRA with specific post-processing heuristics, which can be safely enabled under realistic conditions, as detailed in Section V. ZARATHUSTRA scales well, and can process on average I URL in less than 3 seconds even on our limited infrastructure. Furthermore, as fingerprint generation can be performed independently on samples and URLs, the process is fully parallelizable and scalable.
As discussed in Section IV-E, the generality of the gen erated fingerprints make them suitable for various purposes, beyond mal ware analysis, that can help at mitigating the threat posed by WebInject-based malware. For example, we ZARATHUSTRA offered as a web service or prograrmning API that, given a database of samples (which are abundant today) and a list of URLs, tells which URLs are targeted by which injection. Fingerprint matching is as fast as evaluating an Xpath query, which is trivial and supported by any XML based client-side software.
In sununary, in this paper we make the following contributions:
• We characterize the WebInject mechanism in an implementation-idependent, forward-looking fashion, without needing a-priori knowledge about the API hooking method, nor on the specific configuration encryption-decryption mechanisms used by the mal ware.
• We propose an approach to automatically generate 140 fingerprints of the injections, requiring only the binary sample and the target URLs; as a matter of fact, we automatically generate the relevant information that would normally be available only by reversing and extracting the configuration file of the malware with a manual or non-future-proof process.
• We describe and discuss some case studies and how vendors can incorporate our approach in the browser monitoring components of their antivirus products.
The source code of the ZARATHUSTRA proof of concept is available online at https://code.google.com/p/zarathustra/.
II. WEBINJ ECT-BASED TROJANS
Information-stealing trojans are a growing [4, 11] In addition, the mal ware binaries can be packed and obfuscated in various ways (e.g., different packing method or encryption key). Moreover, the custom configuration files are encrypted, and embedded in the final executable. This characteristic, com bined with the evolving nature of modern trojans, makes it even more difficult to extract the static and dynamic configuration files-besides through time-consuming reverse-engineering ef forts, or in the lucky case that the mal ware itself exposes some vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection, weak cryptography).
III.
GOALS, ApPROACH AND CHALLENGES
The current "solution" against trojans is to use anti-viruses on the client side. Since the host is compromised, we are well aware that client-side-only approaches are not an actual solution. There is no solution when the end host is not trusted.
However, we believe that research should focus on mitiga tion approaches that (1) capture the inherent behavior of the targeted family (e.g., Weblnject trojans) and, based on those behaviors, (2) speedup the generation of signatures. In the case of Weblnject-based malware, the competitive advantage is that they exhibit their behavior in the browser. This makes solutions similar to the successful Google Safebrowsing feasible, with the added benefit of centralized deployments such as those described in Section IV-E.
To pursue our two goals, we believe that a good analysis approach should not rely too much on the implementation details of a malware. To this end, we observe the behavior of Weblnject-based trojans (and other Weblnject-based families) from the point of view of the browser. From hereinafter we use the term "Weblnject" to refer to any mechanism used by malware to inject arbitrary content in the (decrypted) data that transits between the network layer and the rendering engine of a browser.
A. Approach Overview
Our approach is to fingerprint the behavior of any Weblnject-based information stealer by looking for the visible effects of the injection in the targeted websites, regardless of the underlying implementation (e.g., API hooking, DLL patching, other yet unknown techniques). Our approach does not leverage any malware-specific component or vulnerability to observe and characterize the injection behavior. Therefore, it is more generic by design.
Our key observation is that a page rendered on an infected machine unavoidably includes the injected portions of code. In contrast, the same page rendered on a clean machine contains the original source code.
To automatically characterize the Weblnject behavior of a given mal ware sample, our approach requires the mal ware 142 sample executable and a list of target URLs. For example, in the generic case of an anti-virus company that wants to produce signatures for the top 1,000 online baking applica tions, the list of target URLs would contain the URLs of the respective websites. Another use case is the security officer of an organization, who receives a daily feed of malware samples and wants to automatically generate a signatures to quickly determine whether the organization website is targeted.
As output, our approach produces one Xpath expression per URL, which precisely identifies the portion of injected or changed code. For instance, for a given URL, the output looks Xpath expression against the rendered DOM). In the remainder of this paper we focus on the details of characterization process, which is the core part of our contribution.
B. Challenges
Although our approach is conceptually simple when ap plied at a small scale (e.g., by manual analysis of a handful of target websites and samples, as shown in an example by Ormerod [12] ), streamlining it and making it accurate is far from trivial. Indeed, websites may vary legitimately as a consequence of client-and server-side caching or upgrades of the (banking) web application code.
The problem of telling malicious and benign differences apart is hard to solve in general. In fact, a generic solution is beyond the scope of our research. However, in the well defined case of an attacker that needs to inject at least one DOM node (e.g., <script I>, onclick=, l<input I»�, we can address these challenges with specific heuristics as described in Section IV-B and IV-C.
IV.

SYSTEM DETAILS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The implementation of our approach in ZARATHUSTRA is sUlmnarized in Figure 3 . The input of our approach is a list of URLs that we want to check and a sample. For each URL we repeat the following procedure. Since we want to eliminate false positives due to non-significant differences, we first need to make sure that each URL, if visited from two clean machines, do not exhibit any difference. If they do, then we need to ignore such benign difference, as not caused by the mal ware behavior. To this end, in the DOM Collection phase (Section IV-A), ZARATHUSTRA collects a set of DOMs from a set of identical clean (virtual) machines, and one DOM from the machine infected with the malicious executable.
The DOMs are compared in the DOM Comparison phase (Section IV-B), which finds the differences between the "clean DOMs" and the "malicious DOM". In the Fingerprint Gen eration phase (Section IV-C), the differences are analyzed to eliminate obvious duplicates (e.g., due to legitimate changes or caching) and other recurring patterns of legitimate differences.
We implemented the DOM Collection phase on top of Oracle VirtualBox. We wrote a thin library on top of its API to create, snapshot, start-stop the VMs, and a library based for the infected machine. The "malicious DOM" contains the injection that we want to extract.
B. Phase 2: DOM Comparison
This phase compares DOM, the "malicious DOM" against the "clean" DOMi E [I, n] to find distinct differences.
We rely on XMLUnit's DetailedDiff. getAllDiff erences (), which walks the tree of DOM and, for each node, walks the tree of DO Mi to look for the following differences:
• New node: This catches one of the most com mon manifestations of information stealers (e.g., new <input /> fields). This phase takes into account any element type (e.g., forms, scripts, iframes, text). A pure removal of a DOM node (i .. e, not followed by a node insertion) would be against the goals of the malware operator. Substitutions of DOM nodes are accounted for by ZARATHUSTRA as a modification (3rd and 4th case). The output of this phase is a set of DOM differences.
C. Phase 3: Fingerprint Generation
This phase prunes the DOM differences from the DOM Comparison and generates a set of fingerprints. First, we remove the differences between each couple DO Mi and DO Mj, 'Vi i= j to take into account the legitimate changes between "clean DOMs", which could cause false positives. In other words, we obtain a pruned set of differences:
where "difI(A, B)" indicates the distinct differences between DOM A and B, and the malicious differences are those obtained in Phase 2.
The rationale is that by visiting the same URL multi ple times we obtain multiple versions of the same DOM, thus mitigating the effect of legitimate differences caused by session-sensitive content (e.g., caching, cookies). Furthermore, the heuristics 1-4 described in the remainder of this paper eliminate other legitimate differences.
The reader may wonder why, instead of comparing one infected vs. many clean DOMs, we do not compare many infected vs. many clean DOMs. Indeed, this would, in theory, create more variants of both the DOMs (i.e., benign vs. malicious), eliminating the benign differences more effectively.
In practice, we would need to visit each URL from multiple infected virtual machines and compare the collected "malicious DOMs" against the "benign DOMs". This creates a potential performance problem. Moreover, with a pilot study we noticed that one "malicious DOM" per target URL is sufficient. In fact, visiting the same URL from multiple infected machines results in collecting DOMs that contain elements that are already present in the benign DOMs, so that will be eliminated.
In simple words, increasing the number of malicious DOMs beyond one, only increases the required resources without adding any benefit.
An example generated fingerprint for a given URL and sample is: Figure 1 . The set of fingerprints F already contains valuable information that precisely characterizes if and how an injection takes place. As F is generated in a fully automated way, it may still contain some false differences. These are addressed by two heuristics. 2) Heuristic 2: Caching Server Responses: By caching server responses-using the URL as the caching key-we reduce the false differences due to dynamic code generation on the server side, which may insert, for instance, a unique element in each response (e.g., to avoid cross-site request forgery or caching). This simple heuristic can be safely enabled and, as showed in Section V-D, helps at effectively reducing the false positives.
D. Post-processing Heuristics
The output of the previous phase is the set F of finger prints, which is post processed through the following two heuristics that minimize the occurrence of false differences. 
1) Heuristic
E. Application Scenarios
ZARATHUSTRA produces fingerprints in the form of Xpath expressions, which allow to check, on the client side, whether a web page is currently being rendered on an infected machine.
The most natural application is the antivirus scenario. In practice, as depicted in Figure IV -E, we foresee a centralized server, which runs Phase 1-3 on a feed of malware samples and URLs.
In Scenario 1 the URLs are received by the clients Marked resources will be processed by the web framework right before the HTTP response is sent to the requesting client.
In our vision, the web framework will append a Javascript procedure that, once executed on the client, performs a check similar to the one described in the aforementioned "Safebrows ing" scenario. The JavaScript can be obfuscated and inserted in randomized positions, so as to make it difficult for the malware author to selectively remove it. The trojan on the client side may still attempt to disable that JavaScript procedure. Note that disabling Javascript completely is against the attacker goal, because it would disrupt the page. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
B. Setup and Scalability
We run all our experiments on a 1.6GHz, 4-cores x86-64
Intel machine with 16GB of RAM. We installed Windows XP SP3 (Internet Explorer 6, 7, 8) on each VM and granted out bound and inbound Internet access. ZARATHUSTRA required 256MB of RAM and 2 to 5GBs of disk space per VM.
In our experiments we run Phase 1 (DOM Collection) with 2 to 35 VMs to collect the clean DOMs. Figure 5 shows that ZARATHUSTRA scales well overall: With 10 VMs running in parallel we are able to process 1 URL in less than 3 seconds.
The architecture of ZARATHUSTRA has no central node, nor any dependency that prevent full parallel operations: As a result, its capacity scales directly with the amount of resources available. (correctly) detected that a specific sample was performing an injection. We notice that the contribution of the first heuristic is fundamental, because such fraction of URLs decreases to 39.58% (on average) when disabled. The second heuristic also provides a significant contribution, whereas the last two heuristics are not particularly influential in our dataset.
C. Correctness
D. False Positives
False positives occur when ZARATHUSTRA confuses be nign differences as injections. On the data collected during the experiment described in Section V-C, we obtained zero false positives when using all the heuristics.
In a more detailed analysis, we concentrated on the influ ence of Heuristic 1 versus the use of multiple clean VMs. The rationale is that this heuristic was the most effective at eliminating false positives, as the first row of Ta ble II shows.
Thus, after disabling Heuristic 1 we run ZARATHUSTRA with an increasing number n E [1,35] of clean VMs. In this way, we can assess how well ZARATHUSTRA can tell legitimate differences and true positives apart when using a sufficiently large number of emulated clean clients in Phase 1.
As Figure 6 shows, without Heuristic 1 the false positives can still be mitigated by increasing n. The false positive rate approaches almost zero (l %) if at least 35 clean VMs are used. We manually observed that the vast majority of that 1 %, at n = 35, was caused by JavaScript-based advertise ment networks and modifications performed by the browser, which lead to highly-dynamic DOMs. Thus, when deploying ZARATHUSTRA on URLs that have a dynamically-generated DOM, it is reconunended that either Heuristic 1 is enabled, or a large number of VMs is used to create a robust "baseline".
VI. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
From our experiments we can conclude that ZARATHUS TRA can reach zero false positives when all the heuristics are enabled-or with a decent number of clean VMs in their stead-and has zero false negatives by design. State-of-the-art approaches (e.g., via reverse engineering) may reach have zero false positives. However, considered the time required to gen erate signatures with these methods, the price is that of missed (e.g., they contain attributes), an algorithm that matches only the leaf nodes can achieve good accuracy and high generality.
WebInjects are the only artifacts that we rely on to observe the action of an information stealer. Our approach is similar in spirit to [5] , which however focuses on the binary libraries loaded in memory. Instead of focusing on the specific DLL hooking mechanism and functions adopted, we concentrate on the manifestation of such hooking in the browser.
Also [6] is related to our work, since it protects the browser from malicious websites that perform dynamic changes of the DOM. Although not designed specifically to target information stealers, it could be applied to recognize WebInjects. The system instruments the ECMA script layer by proxying its functions so to profile their execution and recognize malicious patterns. However, the authors mention that their method can detect changes of the DOM that occur at runtime, whereas
WebInjects work at the source-code level.
Along a different line, Riccardi et al.
[13] developed a chosen-plaintext attack against the encrypted stream that flows between ZeuS (1.x and 2.x) and its C&C. The chosen plaintext is a combination of the information from the analysis of the malware toolkit and the data collected while running a sample in a controlled environment (e.g., cookies, user credentials, or computer hostname). These attacks are effective against a specific version of a malware binary. Unfortunately, they require the reverse engineering of the mal ware.
VIII. FUTURE WORK
Besides addressing the discussion points described in Sec tion VI, future research should concentrate on more advanced uses of WebInjects.
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As described in Kharouni [7] targeted attacks may not result in DOM modifications. An example is a banking web application that allows to divert a wire transfer by simply modifying one, single parameter in an outgoing HTTP request, the respective HTTP response (e.g., page that confirms the result of a transaction), and all the subsequent pages. This threat will require modifications to ZARATHUSTRA, because the injections may occur in pure text nodes. Thus, the set of heuristics will need to be refined to cope with these corner cases.
Finally, in this paper we showed that the DOM is a simple yet effective observation point. We believe that other aspects of the browser behavior can be observed and compared on infected vs. clean clients, to assess whether the information stealers cause side effects in the browser that can be used as a detection criteria.
IX.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented ZARATHUSTRA, an auto mated system to observe the client side behavior of financial trojans that perform WebInjects. ZARATHUSTRA generates fingerprints of the DOM differences by comparing web pages as they are rendered in an instrumented browser running on clean and infected virtual machines. The first advantage of our system is that of requiring no reverse-engineering effort.
Moreover, our approach is future proof by design.
Our evaluation of ZARATHUSTRA against 213 real, live
URLs of banking websites and 56 distinct samples of ZeuS show that, in all the cases, our system extracted all the injections correctly. The low rate of false positives (1.0%) were caused by legitimate differences in the original web pages. We have developed specific heuristics, which can reduce such false positives to zero. ZARATHUSTRA scales well, and can generate fingerprints for 1 URL in less than 3 seconds on average, even on our modest infrastructure.
Although simple, our approach has the great advantage of being completely agnostic with respect to the source of the differences: As long as the manipulated data is observable, our approach can be generalized to create further "difference modeling" techniques that can be used to characterize the activity of an information stealer from other observation points. 
